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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 980268-CA
Priority No. 2

Henry Jeffry Suarez
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SINCE THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS UNDISPUTED IN
THIS CASE, THE ONLY QUESTION ON APPEAL IS WHETHER THE RECORD
SUPPORTS BAD FAITH AS A MATTER OF LAW,
Defendant/Appellant Henry Jeffry Suarez ("Suarez") has
appealed to this Court to reverse his convictions for rape of a
child and sodomy on a child on the grounds that the state was
barred under the double jeopardy provisions of the state and
federal constitutions from prosecuting the matter.

(Opening

Brief, dated December 7, 1998.) In its brief, the state has recognized that in a case where a criminal defendant has requested
a mistrial, as in Suarez's case, and the request is granted,
double jeopardy will bar retrial of the matter if the judge or
the prosecutor provoked the mistrial in bad faith. (State's Brief
at 9-11.)

Suarez has raised the issue of bad faith on appeal.

(Opening Brief at 7-15.)
As stated in the Opening Brief, the transcript of the second
trial reflects that during opening statements,1 counsel for the

1 The first trial ended in a mistrial during jury voir dire. That
proceeding is not relevant to this appeal.

defense asserted that the state failed to conduct an adequate
investigation into the rape and sodomy charges. (R. 464:29.)
Thereafter, during its case-in-chief, the state called Detective
James Chandler to testify. (R. 464:143.)
During the state's direct examination, Chandler described
his investigative efforts, including the fact that he interviewed
the victim and Suarez's wife.

(R. 464:144-149.)

The prosecutor

asked questions concerning Suarez's wife, and the defense
objected during a side-bar conference that such testimony
violated Suarez's constitutional right not to have his spouse
testify against him.

(See R. 464:164-66.)

After the side-bar

conference, the prosecutor asked additional questions concerning
Chandler's investigative efforts. Chandler testified that he was
unable to obtain information regarding the matter from Suarez
because he refused to talk to Chandler.

(R. 464:148-49.)

The

defense objected to the testimony on the basis that it violated
Suarez's due process rights under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976), and the trial court granted a mistrial. (R. 464:175.)
Thereafter, the defense requested a dismissal of the charges
on the grounds that double jeopardy barred the state from proceeding with another trial in the matter since the prosecutor
provoked the mistrial in bad faith.

(R. 160-80.)

The trial

judge stated that the prosecutor "didn't elicit the statement in
this case, so I don't find that it's prosecution error." (R.
464:173-74.) In a hearing on the matter, the judge considered the
pleadings and transcript of the proceedings and found that the
2

witness made an error in judgment when he testified in violation
of Doyle. (R. 465:4.) The court concluded there was no bad faith.
On appeal, the state claims Suarez has failed to challenge
the trial court's findings in this matter. (State's Brief at 12,
14.)

Yet, Suarez does not contest the content of the trial

transcript. Rather, Suarez has challenged the ruling as incorrect
as a matter of law.

(See Opening Brief at 6-15.) That is, where

the issue of bad faith normally "is a mixed question of law and
fact," see Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah
1998) (citing Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah
App. 1989)); State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998);
(Opening Brief at 1 ) , since the issue in the case is based on an
undisputed transcript, the standard of review should be the
correction-of-error standard for questions of law, where this
Court will give no deference to the trial court's ruling.2
This Court has recognized application of the correction-oferror standard in numerous contexts where the issue is based on
an undisputed transcript.

In that context, this Court will treat

the issue on appeal as a conclusion that presents a "question[]
of law which we review under a correction of error standard."

2 As a point of clarification, the standard of review identified
in Suarez's Opening Brief is incomplete since it recognizes only
that the issue of bad faith is a mixed question of law and fact.
(Opening Brief at 1.) However, as reflected in the Opening
Brief, Suarez is not contesting the content of the transcript and
has raised the issue of bad faith as a matter of law. (Opening
Brief at 7-15.) The standard of review in the Opening Brief
should be amended to reflect that where the issue on appeal is
based on an undisputed transcript, this Court will review the
matter under a correction-of-error standard.
3

State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah App. 1997) (citing
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993)); State v.
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993) (observing appellate
courts review conclusions of law under non-deferential correction
of error standard when facts are undisputed); Vali Convalescent
and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing, 797
P.2d 438, 450 (Utah App. 1990) (where conclusions are based on
undisputed facts, this Court reviews the matter under the
correction-of-error standard); see also Transamerica Cash
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah
1990) (same standard for review of summary judgment, which
necessarily involves undisputed facts); Trulis v. Barton, 107
F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that uncontroverted
facts may demonstrate "bad faith as a matter of law").
Accordingly, the question in this case is whether the transcript
supports that as a matter of law the prosecutor acted in bad
faith.3
Specifically, a prosecutor is charged with knowing the
investigator's case.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 n.5

(Utah 1987). In this case, the prosecutor would have known that
questions concerning witness cooperation during the investigation
would eventually lead to a Doyle violation, since the prosecutor
3 If the prosecutor had asked the following question of
Chandler, her motive in provoking a mistrial would have been
clearer: "Officer, were you hoping to talk to the defendant but
he refused to talk to you because he invoked his Miranda rights?"
Because the prosecutor's question was not that direct, the
analysis is more complex, as set forth in the Opening Brief.
(Opening Brief, at 7-15.)
4

would have known that Suarez did not cooperate with the officer
because he had exercised his right to remain silent. (Opening
Brief at 11-13.)

Notwithstanding her knowledge of the situation,

the prosecutor continued examining Chandler about the matter
without admonishing him not to discuss Suarez's involvement in
the investigation. See State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 656-57 (Utah
1982) (where the judge and prosecutor admonished officer not to
discuss certain matters, his testimony in violation of the
admonitions was a complete surprise).
In addition, in the Opening Brief, Suarez pointed out that
as the prosecutor continued questioning the officer about his
investigation, she drew objections for other constitutional
violations.

The prosecutor was on notice that her examination

was leading the officer into areas that constitutionally were
impermissible. (Opening Brief at 13.)

Also, the prosecutor was

pursuing an inappropriate line of questioning in that she had
diverted from establishing a prima facie case to rebutting
unproven facts.

See Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah

App. 1998) ("Rebuttal evidence should be limited to evidence made
necessary by the opponent's case-in-reply ... and evidence
required to counter new facts presented in the defendant's casein-chief")/

(R. 464:153).

The trial court recognized that by pursuing the line of
questioning, the prosecutor ran the risk of a mistrial.
[T]he whole line of questioning [by the state] on [the
officer's] investigation - Mr. Yengich has said in opening
statement, which is not evidence, that your investigator's
were not thorough. You don't have to rebut that. I don't
5

understand why you are rebutting that.
Present your case, and then if it turns out they are
not thorough, then bring it back on rebuttal after he's
presented his case. But to prove, as a matter of your case
in chief, to rebut something that's said in opening
statement doesn't seem to me to give me any help and the
jury any help, and only runs the risk of this kind of motion
[for a mistrial] being raised.
(R. 464:153.) The state does not dispute the circumstances set
forth above giving rise to the mistrial.

They support bad faith.

See In re Keeaan Management Co., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996)
(pursuit of improper argument constituted bad faith).
Also, the state claims this Court's ruling in State v.
Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993), is not controlling here.
(See State's Brief at 16.)

That is incorrect.

In Nilson, this

Court was required to consider undisputed facts to resolve issues
concerning application of the double jeopardy provision.

In

doing so, this Court recognized that factual matters presenting a
"close call" must be resolved in defendant's favor.
Specifically, in Nilson, the victim testified that the
offense occurred on a date other than that which was charged in
the Information.

As a result of the testimony, the state moved

to dismiss the case.
dismissal.

The defense did not object to the

Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029.

This Court was required to

determine whether a "lack of objection" constituted consent,
which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In refusing
to find consent, this Court specified that any doubts or close
calls with respect to the matter would be resolved "in a
defendant's favor."

Nilson, 854 P.2d at 1032.

In Suarez's case, the matter concerns the prosecutor's
6

motives and intentions in pursuing an improper line of
questioning.

The doubts and close calls surrounding that issue

should be resolved in Suarez's favor, specifically since the
prosecutor was in a unique position in that she shared in the
officer's knowledge about the investigation, he was her witness,
and he was a member of the prosecution team.
918 n.5.

Knight, 734 P.2d at

In addition, the prosecutor was undeterred in her

determination to continue an improper line of questioning even
after a bench conference concerning the constitutional validity
of questions about the officer's investigation of the matter. To
the extent the undisputed transcript in this matter raises doubts
or close calls with respect to the matter, they should be
resolved in Suarez's favor pursuant to Nilson.
Finally, the state asserts that even if the prosecutor
intended that her line of questioning would lead the officer to
providing testimony in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976), the questions were justified "by the fact that defense
counsel 'opened the door' to this line of questioning by putting
at issue the State's investigative effort."
14-15.)

(State's Brief at

The state's argument on this point is not supported by

the record or Utah law.
Indeed, the state's open-door argument was specifically
rejected by the trial judge.

He criticized the prosecutor for

pursuing the improper line of questioning since the door had not
been opened with evidence of the matter. (R. 464:153.)
Further, the state relies on State v. Rudolph, 349 Utah Adv.
7

Rep. 11, 17 (Utah 1998), in
case is distinguishable.

making its open-door argument. That

In Rudolph, the defendant elicited

testimony from a state witness, and the state followed-up on
redirect with additional questions concerning the matter. Id.
Defendant claimed the state's follow-up questions were inappropriate.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the defendant

opened the door to the line of questioning when he elicited
testimony from the witness.

Id. at 17.

Rudolph supports the

determination that the open-door doctrine does not apply here,
since, as the trial court in Suarez's case found, no evidence had
been presented that would have allowed the state to pursue the
line of questioning in this case that resulted in the Doyle
violation.

(See R. 464:153.) The state's argument that Suarez

"opened the door" is unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Suarez's rights
under the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated. Suarez
respectfully requests reversal of this matter.
SUBMITTED this

Lit

AfisJjL

day of

, 1999.

LINDA M. JONES
VERNICE AH CHING
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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